Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam eBook John Nagl Kostenloser PDF Reader UHG

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam eBook John Nagl ebook IQD

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Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances.

Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

ebook,John Nagl,Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,Praeger,Reference,Asia - Southeast Asia,Counterinsurgency,Counterinsurgency - Malayasia - Malaya,Counterinsurgency - Vietnam,Counterinsurgency;Malaysia;Malaya.,General,HISTORY / Military / General,History,History - Military / War,History / Asia / Southeast Asia,History / Reference,History Military - General,History/Asia - Southeast Asia,History World,Malaya,Malaya - History - Malayan Emergency, 1948-,Malaya - History - Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,Malaya;History;Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.,Malaysia,Military - General,Military History,Military tactics,Political Science General,Political Science/General,Reference,Reference works,Underground movements,Vietnam,Vietnam War, 1961-1975,Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -,Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Underground movements,Vietnam War, 1961-1975;Underground movements.,World history,Asia - Southeast Asia,General,HISTORY / Military / General,History / Asia / Southeast Asia,History / Reference,History Military - General,History/Asia - Southeast Asia,Military - General,Political Science General,Political Science/General,History - Military / War,Counterinsurgency,Malaya,Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,Malayasia,Malaysia,Underground movements,Vietnam,Vietnam War, 1961-1975,History,History World,Military tactics,Reference works,World history

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam eBook John Nagl Reviews :

Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances.

Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

ebook,John Nagl,Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,Praeger,Reference,Asia - Southeast Asia,Counterinsurgency,Counterinsurgency - Malayasia - Malaya,Counterinsurgency - Vietnam,Counterinsurgency;Malaysia;Malaya.,General,HISTORY / Military / General,History,History - Military / War,History / Asia / Southeast Asia,History / Reference,History Military - General,History/Asia - Southeast Asia,History World,Malaya,Malaya - History - Malayan Emergency, 1948-,Malaya - History - Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,Malaya;History;Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.,Malaysia,Military - General,Military History,Military tactics,Political Science General,Political Science/General,Reference,Reference works,Underground movements,Vietnam,Vietnam War, 1961-1975,Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -,Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Underground movements,Vietnam War, 1961-1975;Underground movements.,World history,Asia - Southeast Asia,General,HISTORY / Military / General,History / Asia / Southeast Asia,History / Reference,History Military - General,History/Asia - Southeast Asia,Military - General,Political Science General,Political Science/General,History - Military / War,Counterinsurgency,Malaya,Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,Malayasia,Malaysia,Underground movements,Vietnam,Vietnam War, 1961-1975,History,History World,Military tactics,Reference works,World history

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counter Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam eBook John Nagl

 

Product details File Size 2934 KB Print Length 272 pages Publisher Praeger (October 30, 2002) Publication Date October 30, 2002 Sold by  Services LLC Language English ASIN B000QECG20

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